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We discuss three experiments that investigate how virtual limbs and bodies can come to feel 
like real limbs and bodies. The ﬁ  rst experiment shows that an illusion of ownership of a virtual 
arm appearing to project out of a person’s shoulder can be produced by tactile stimulation on 
a person’s hidden real hand and synchronous stimulation on the seen virtual hand. The second 
shows that the illusion can be produced by synchronous movement of the person’s hidden real 
hand and a virtual hand. The third shows that a weaker form of the illusion can be produced when 
a brain–computer interface is employed to move the virtual hand by means of motor imagery 
without any tactile stimulation. We discuss related studies that indicate that the ownership 
illusion may be generated for an entire body. This has important implications for the scientiﬁ  c 
understanding of body ownership and several practical applications.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper describes work that brings together 
two apparently different ﬁ  elds of research. The 
ﬁ  rst is concerned with how the brain forms a 
representation of the body, so that we can dis-
tinguish what is part of ourselves and what is not. 
The second is concerned with the question of the 
conditions under which people act and respond 
to events and situations within virtual reality as 
if these were real, sometimes called the study of 
presence (Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005). If we 
could achieve a situation whereby a computer 
generated virtual body temporarily results in the 
illusion that it is your body, this would address 
problems of interest to both ﬁ  elds. First, it would 
give us some understanding about the mecha-
nisms of ‘real’ body ownership and would also 
demonstrate the high plasticity of body represen-
tation. Second, responding to a virtual body as if it 
were your own body is perhaps the most powerful 
demonstration of presence in virtual reality. If we 
were able to accomplish this then we would have 
greater understanding of the factors necessary to 
produce and maintain the experience of presence, 
with implications for future virtual reality tech-
nology development.
In this paper we ﬁ  rst review our work on 
the problem of the ownership of a virtual arm 
and hand, through a virtual reality replication 
of the rubber hand illusion. Second, we relate 
this to the wider problem of ownership of entire 
bodies.
THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION
The rubber hand illusion was ﬁ  rst described by 
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) – but see Tastevin 
(1937) for an early anecdotal account. It was 
shown that synchronous tapping on a person’s 
hidden real arm and an aligned visible rubber 
arm placed in front of them results in a feeling 
of ownership of the fake arm. For a review see 
Makin et al. (2008).
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The rubber hand phenomenon has been 
  replicated several times. For example Armel and 
Ramachandran (2003) additionally showed that 
arousal, as measured by an increase in electroder-
mal activity, was associated with manipulations 
of the rubber hand that would normally cause 
pain. Indeed this objective evidence for the illu-
sion was further substantiated with functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, demonstrating 
that the stronger the rubber hand illusion the 
stronger the threat-evoked neuronal responses in 
areas related to pain anticipation (Ehrsson et al., 
2007). Another important observation was that 
for the illusion to work well it is required that the 
fake arm look like an arm (Tsakiris and Haggard, 
2005), and that the rubber arm should be aligned 
with the orientation of the real arm (Ehrsson 
et al., 2004; Pavani et al., 2000). This suggests that 
the multisensory integration producing the illu-
sion operates in hand-centered reference frames 
(Costantini and Haggard, 2007).
There have also been results from brain imaging 
studies identifying activity in multisensory areas, 
such as areas in the intraparietal sulcus and the 
ventral premotor cortex, associated with the illu-
sion (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005, 2007) an activity 
that was greater when the rubber arm was aligned 
in parallel with the real hand (Ehrsson et al., 2004). 
Regarding the underlying mechanisms it has been 
suggested that the illusion happens as the result 
of the integration and interpretation of visual, 
tactile and position sense (proprioceptive) signals 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). 
Neurons in multisensory areas that integrate this 
type of information could implement the nec-
essary neuronal computations causing changes 
in body ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; 
Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2006).
THE VIRTUAL HAND ILLUSION
EXPERIMENT 1 – VISUAL–TACTILE SYNCHRONY
In  Slater et  al. (2008a) we showed that the 
illusion could be reproduced in virtual real-
ity. Instead of a rubber arm, participants saw a 
completely virtual arm projecting out of their 
right shoulder. This was achieved with a back-
projected screen onto which a stereo image 
of an arm was rendered, which together with 
head-tracking gives the powerful illusion that the 
virtual arm is attached to the shoulder and pro-
jecting forward in space. The real hand was hid-
den behind a screen, and the room was darkened. 
A second six degrees of freedom tracked device 
(a Wand) was employed where its movements 
in real space were replicated by the movements 
of a small yellow ball in the 3D virtual space. 
The illusion that the rubber hand becomes 
owned by the person as if it were the real hand 
can occur as early as 10–20 s after the start of 
synchronous visual–tactile stimulation (Ehrsson 
et al., 2004; Lloyd, 2007), and is indicated by two 
different response measurements. The ﬁ  rst  is 
based on an ownership illusion questionnaire 
that has come to be fairly standard in the ﬁ  eld 
which was introduced in the original Botvinick 
and Cohen (1998) article.
The second response measure is based on 
the idea that if the subject’s proprioceptive sys-
tem has actually been fooled into locating the 
hand where the rubber hand is then they should 
blindly point towards it rather than towards the 
real hand when asked to point at their own hand 
(Botvinick and Cohen 1998). A verbal report of 
the felt position of the hand judged against a ruler 
has also been used (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; 
Tsakiris et al., 2006). The distance between the 
two locations is the proprioceptive drift, and the 
stronger the subjective illusion the greater this 
behavioural indication of the illusion. Typically, 
both the questionnaire and proprioceptive drift 
measures indicate that the illusion occurs, but 
when the tactile sensation on the real hand is 
not synchronous with the corresponding visual 
stimuli on the rubber hand then the illusion 
breaks down.
The amount of stimulation time used to 
induce the illusion varies considerably amongst 
the different experiments. In Botvinick and 
Cohen (1998) there was stimulation for 10 min 
in their ﬁ  rst experiment, and up to 30 min in the 
second. Ehrsson and colleagues stimulated the 
hands for periods of 42 s (Ehrsson et al., 2004) 
or 88 s (Ehrsson et al., 2007). Ehrsson et al. (2007) 
reported that in those subjects where the illusion 
was evoked, the mean time to the onset of the illu-
sion was 11.3 ± 7.0 s (SD) and in their 2007 paper 
it was 14.3  ±  9.1  s (SD). Lloyd stimulated the 
hands for periods of 60 s and concluded that ‘…
the rubber hand illusion is a pervasive perceptual 
phenomenon, which can be elicited in less than 
15 s in approximately eight out of ten people’. 
Armel and Ramachandran (2003) reported that 
their pilot experiments showed that a ‘compel-
ling illusion’ was obtained after 2.5 min. Tsakiris 
and Haggard (2005) and later studies by Tsakiris 
typically used 4 min of stimulation. In our vir-
tual reality experiment (Section ‘Experiment 1 – 
Visual–Tactile Synchrony’) we used 5 min. In a 
recent rubber hand illusion experiment we asked 
participants to indicate when they felt the illu-
sion. The median waiting times of the 43 who 
experienced the illusion was 27 s (range 5–116 s 
and mean ± SD 43 ± 34 s).
Virtual Reality
Sensory data generated by a computer 
system may be perceived as physical 
reality, especially when perception
is enabled by use of the body in a 
manner similar to physical reality. 
The system ideally displays in all 
sensory modalities; fully encloses the 
person in these displays; tracks head 
position and orientation but also 
the movements of the whole body, 
determining the visual stereo 
and spatialised auditory displays as 
a function of this tracking.
Presence
Virtual reality may generate the illusion 
of being in the rendered virtual place. 
When contingent events in the virtual 
world apparently relate directly to the 
participant, then further there is the 
illusion that what is occurring is real. 
Under these conditions participants 
tend to act and respond to the virtual 
reality as if it were real.
Rubber hand illusion
An illusion that may be induced 
by an experimenter tapping a person’s 
real but hidden hand, while 
synchronously tapping a rubber 
hand placed in a visible and plausible 
position in front of the subject. 
The real hand is hidden behind a 
screen. After a short period of such 
stimulation the person has the illusion 
that the rubber arm is their arm 
and feels the taps from the location 
of the rubber hand.
Ownership illusion questionnaire
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) used 
nine questions. Three questions 
indicated the rubber hand illusion: 
‘It seemed as if I were feeling the touch 
of the paintbrush in the location 
where I saw the rubber hand touched’; 
‘It seemed as though the touch I felt 
was caused by the paintbrush touching 
the rubber hand’; ‘I felt as if the rubber 
hand were my hand’. The other six 
questions are typically used as controls.
Proprioceptive drift
Before the stimulation for the rubber 
hand illusion the participants are 
instructed to close their eyes and point 
(under the table on which their hand 
is resting) to the center of where they 
feel their hand to be, and to repeat 
this after the stimulation. The distance 
between these two locations is the 
proprioceptive drift.Frontiers in Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  September  2009 | Volume  3 | Issue  2 | 216
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1.  Sometimes I had the feeling that I was receiving 
the hits in the location of the virtual arm.
2.  During the experiment there were moments 
in which it seemed as if what I was feeling was 
caused by the yellow ball that I was seeing on 
the screen.
3.  During the experiment there were moments 
in which I felt as if the virtual arm was my 
own arm.
Each question was rated by the participants 
using a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 meaning 
‘totally disagree’ and 7 ‘totally agree’. There were 
six other questions that are normally thought of 
When the experimenter touched the real hand 
of the subject with the Wand, the subject would 
see the virtual ball touch the virtual hand, reg-
istered in the same place on the virtual hand. In 
this way synchronous visual and tactile stimuli 
could be applied to the virtual and real hand 
(Figure 1A). The asynchronous stimulation in 
the control condition was achieved by using pre-
recorded movements of the virtual ball. Using 
this setup we compared the responses between 
two groups of volunteers, with 21 participants 
in the synchronous and 20 in the asynchronous 
condition. The speciﬁ  c questions we used to 
indicate the illusion were:
Figure 1 | Four experiments on the virtual arm illusion. (A) Visual–tactile correlations – the experimenter touches the real hand with a wand and the participant 
sees the virtual ball touch the virtual hand. (B) Visual, motor and proprioceptive correlations – the participant wears a data glove and moves his ﬁ  ngers and hand 
and the virtual hand moves. (C) Adding shadows for the ball and arm. (D) Using a brain–computer interface with cued motor imagery – the arrows point to the left 
or the right as cues for the motor imagery.Frontiers in Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  September  2009 | Volume  3 | Issue  2 | 217
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tual arm induced motor activity in the real arm 
in the synchronous condition.
EXPERIMENT 2 – VISUAL–MOTOR SYNCHRONY
Having demonstrated that visuo-tactile correla-
tions can induce an illusion of ownership of a vir-
tual arm, we then explored whether this illusion 
can be induced in the absence of tactile stimula-
tion – see also Dummer et al. (2009) and Tsakiris 
et al. (2006). We carried out an experiment to 
investigate whether the virtual arm illusion can 
be induced by active movements of the ﬁ  ngers and 
hand (Sanchez-Vives et al. in preparation with a 
preliminary report by Slater et al., 2008b). There 
were 14 male participants in this within-groups 
counter-balanced experimental design. The illu-
sion related questions were:
1.  I sometimes felt as if my hand was located 
where I saw the virtual hand to be.
2.  Sometimes I felt that the virtual arm was my 
own arm.
Here the participants wore a data glove that 
detects hand and ﬁ  nger positions and transmits 
real-time data to the computer that controls the 
display of a virtual hand (Figure 1B). Only when 
the movement of the virtual hand was synchro-
nous with the movement of the participant’s real 
hand there was an ownership illusion. This was 
indicated by questionnaire response (the two 
questions above) and proprioceptive drift (using 
the method introduced by Botvinick and Cohen, 
1998). The fact the illusion could be induced by 
active movements and congruent visual feedback 
is important for virtual reality applications where 
participants will need to interact with environ-
mental objects.
EXPERIMENT 3 – USING A BRAIN–COMPUTER 
INTERFACE
We carried out a further experiment but with-
out any tactile stimulation or overt movements 
(Perez-Marcos et  al., 2009). Here the partici-
pants had the task to open and close their vir-
tual hand through a brain–computer interface 
(BCI). This used a cued motor imagery paradigm 
(Pfurtscheller and Neuper, 2001) on which par-
ticipant had been previously trained (Figure 1D). 
There were two conditions – in the synchronous 
one the hand opened and closed as a function of 
the participant’s motor imagery. In the second – 
asynchronous – condition the hand opened 
and closed independently of the subject’s motor 
imagery. In the synchronous condition, but not in 
the asynchronous, there was a sense of ownership 
of the virtual hand. After the 5 min of BCI control 
as control questions, not indicating the illusion, 
but see the discussion about these in Section 4.2 
of Slater et al. (2008a). The illusion was pro-
duced both with respect to the questionnaire 
based measure and with respect to propriocep-
tive drift – where the mean drift was signiﬁ  cantly 
greater for the synchronous condition compared 
with the asynchronous, and where the drift was 
signiﬁ  cantly greater than 0 for the synchronous 
condition, but not for the asynchronous. To give 
an idea of the differences between the synchro-
nous and asynchronous conditions, the medians 
of questions 1–3 were each 6 for the synchro-
nous   condition (with interquartile ranges 2, 1 
and 2.25), and the medians were 1.5, 1 and 2 
(with IQRs 1, 1 and 2.5) for the asynchronous 
condition. Using Mann–Whitney U tests all three 
signiﬁ  cance levels for the difference between 
the synchronous and asynchronous conditions 
were less than 0.00025. The median proprio-
ceptive drift in the synchronous condition was 
30  mm (IQR 80  mm) and for asynchronous 
condition the corresponding values were 0 mm 
(and 30 mm). The Mann–Whitney U test gives 
a signiﬁ  cance level of 0.0017 for the difference 
between these. Taking the results for both groups 
together there is a signiﬁ  cant positive correla-
tion between the proprioceptive drift and the 
mean of questions 1–3 above (n = 391, r = 0.41, 
P < 0.011, and residual errors not signiﬁ  cantly 
different from Normal).
One of the advantages of a virtual reality rep-
resentation is that it is possible to easily go beyond 
what is feasible in the physical world. Here, after 
the 5 min of stimulation (synchronous or asyn-
chronous) the virtual arm was programmed to 
rotate (supination), and then rotate back again 
(pronation), for a total of 12 s. Our interest was 
to investigate whether the sight of the owned vir-
tual arm moving would recruit automatic pos-
tural adjustment mechanisms, for example, to 
stabilise the arm. In this experiment we recorded 
electrical activity from the arm muscles using 
electromyography (EMG), and compared the 
EMG signal while the virtual arm was moving 
to a period before it was moving. Speciﬁ  cally the 
muscle activation was measured as the number 
of onsets, where an onset occurs when a recti-
ﬁ  ed and ﬁ  ltered version of the raw signal stays 
above a threshold for at least 25 ms (Di Fabio, 
1987). We found that in the synchronous condi-
tion only, there was a positive correlation between 
the subjective strength of the illusion as measured 
by the mean of the three questions above and the 
number of EMG onsets between 4 and 6 s after 
the arm started rotating. This therefore provided 
physiological evidence that movements in the vir-
Brain–computer interface (BCI)
The electrical signals produced 
by the brain are analysed in real time 
and used to control external devices 
or events. Typically there is a training 
period where a computer programme 
learns the association between certain 
features of the brain recorded activity 
and speciﬁ  c thoughts. Later, events 
are triggered whenever the computer 
programme recognises which 
of a particular set of these features 
has been generated.
Cued motor imagery
Participants are asked to produce 
a particular type of thought in response 
to a cue. In this case the thought 
is imagination of limb movement. 
For example, in our BCI experiment, 
participants were cued to think of 
moving their left hand in order to close 
the virtual hand, and f moving their 
right foot in order to open the hand.Frontiers in Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  September  2009 | Volume  3 | Issue  2 | 218
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position, and is therefore indirect evidence for 
the idea that a virtual body might become felt 
as one’s own.
More direct evidence has come from Petkova 
and Ehrsson (2008), who employed cameras 
attached to the head of a manikin that was look-
ing down on the manikin’s body. Again the video-
signals from these cameras were presented in real 
time to the participant who was wearing a set of 
head-mounted displays. Now looking down at 
themselves subjects would see the manikin body 
in a similar location where their own body would 
be. Synchronous tapping on the stomach of the 
manikin and the real stomach resulted in a strong 
illusion of ownership of the entire body (as evi-
denced by the questionnaire responses), which 
was again conﬁ  rmed by augmented skin conduct-
ance responses in correspondence to physical 
attacks on different body parts of the manikin in 
the synchronous but not in the asynchronous tap-
ping condition. This suggests that entire bodies 
can be owned and that ownership of one stimu-
lated body part automatically enhance ownership 
of other seen parts of the body.
A similar full body experiment was reported by 
Lenggenhager et al. (2007). In the critical experi-
ment the participants looked at a body presented 
a few meters in front of their selves through a 
head-mounted display. Thus the participants saw 
the back of the body, and when the experimenter 
stroked them on their back, they would see this 
stroking on the back at the distant body location. 
This resulted in the reported sense of being at the 
location of the body in front, and a version of the 
proprioceptive drift measure provided a further 
veriﬁ  cation. In this case there was a reported pro-
jection of the sense of touch and self-localisation to 
a body observed from a third-person perspective, 
which is different from the experiments by Ehrsson 
(2007) and Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) where the 
owned artiﬁ  cial body was always perceived from 
ﬁ  rst person perspective. To what extent the reported 
self attribution in these two set of experiments 
engage common or different perceptual mecha-
nisms is still an open question (see Science E-letters 
for further discussion2). However, Lenggenhager 
et al. (2009) recently reported an experiment that 
directly compared the two paradigms and found 
evidence to suggest that self-localisation is strongly 
inﬂ  uenced by where the correlated visual–tactile 
event is seen to occur.
DISCUSSION
The experiments reviewed in this article strongly 
suggest that virtual limbs and bodies in virtual 
reality could be owned by participants just as 
rubber hands can be perceived as part of one’s 
(synchronous or asynchronous) of the arm, the 
virtual arm and table suddenly fell and the EMG 
recordings showed that there was greater muscle 
activity in the arm compared to an earlier ref-
erence period before the arm fell – but only for 
the synchronous condition. However, there was 
no proprioceptive drift in either condition. This 
may suggest that actual sensory feedback (touch 
or proprioceptive feedback) is necessary for rec-
alibration of position sense and the elicitation of 
a full-blown virtual hand illusion. Alternatively, 
mental imagery may not be as potent in inducing 
the illusion as actual stimulation. Future experi-
ments are needed to clarify to what degree virtual 
limbs can be owned by BCI control alone.
THE VIRTUAL BODY
To what extent can the multisensory correlations 
employed to produce the virtual hand illusion 
generalise to the whole body? The evidence 
is beginning to point towards an afﬁ  rmative 
answer to this question – that the illusion of 
ownership of a virtual body may be generated. 
There is both indirect and direct evidence for 
this. In Ehrsson (2007) a setup was employed 
to give people the illusion that they were behind 
their real bodies. Subjects wore a set of head-
mounted displays that displayed real-time stere-
oscopic images from two cameras located behind 
where they were actually seated – thus shifting 
their visual ego-center to behind themselves. 
The experimenter was standing just behind the 
participant and the participant could see where 
they were sitting in the room and identify the 
experimenter standing behind them just next 
to them. The experimenter then used a stick 
to tap their chest (out of sight) while tapping 
underneath the location of the cameras. The felt 
tapping was either synchronous with the visual 
jabbing movements towards a point beneath the 
cameras, or asynchronous. In the synchronous 
condition subjects reported a strong illusion of 
being behind their physical bodies as judged 
by the questionnaire responses, for example ‘I 
experienced that I was located at some distance 
behind the visual image of myself, almost as if I 
were looking at someone else’ (Supplementary 
Figure 1,  Ehrsson, 2007). People also experi-
enced that the scientist was standing in front 
of them, i.e. there had been a change in the per-
ceived self- location. This ﬁ  nding was reinforced 
by skin conductance responses that correlated 
with an attack on their ‘phantom body’ location 
in the synchronous but not in the asynchronous 
condition. Thus this is evidence that the sense 
of one’s body place can be dislocated to a posi-
tion which is different from the body’s veridical Frontiers in Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  September  2009 | Volume  3 | Issue  2 | 219
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the development of virtual reality applications 
because it means that one is not restricted to 
ultra-realistic simulations and high deﬁ  nition 
visual displays.
Virtual reality additionally provides power 
to investigate these illusions at the whole body 
level. In Figure 2 we show an example of what 
can be seen when someone wears a tracked 
head-mounted display, looks down, and sees a 
virtual body in place of their real one. The very 
act of looking down, changing head orientation 
in order to gaze in a certain direction, with the 
visual images changing as they would in reality 
is already a powerful clue that you are located 
in the virtual place that you perceive. We argue 
elsewhere that multisensory contingencies that 
correspond approximately to those employed 
to perceive physical reality provide a necessary 
  condition for the illusion of being in the virtual 
place (Slater 2009). Now imagine that you move, 
and the virtual body moves in correspondence 
with your movements, or you see something 
touch your virtual body and you feel the touch 
in the corresponding location in your real body. 
These events add signiﬁ  cantly to the reality of 
what is being perceived – not only are you in the 
virtual place, but you also have the illusion that 
the events occurring are real – therefore increasing 
the likelihood that you would respond realistically 
to virtual events and situations.
body in physical reality. Furthermore, the experi-
mental ﬁ  ndings suggest that ownership of virtual 
limbs and bodies may engage the same percep-
tual, emotional, and motor processes that make 
us feel that we own our biological bodies. To what 
extent this ‘virtual body illusion’ works when the 
movements of the simulated body are control-
led directly by the participants thoughts, via BCI 
control, is an important emerging area for future 
experiments.
The visual realism of the virtual arm and 
the arm’s environment does not seem to play 
an important role for the induction of the illu-
sion. In our laboratory we have seen the illusion 
work well with many different types of simulated 
hands. This is similar to the traditional rubber 
hand illusion which does not seem to depend on 
the physical similarity between the rubber hand 
and the person’s real hand – anecdotal obser-
vations; see also (Longo et al., 2009). Further, 
adding realism to the simulation by adding shad-
ows (Figure 1C) did not enhance the ownership 
illusion (Perez-Marcos et al., 2007), unpublished 
results. These observations would ﬁ  t with physi-
ological properties of cells in premotor and 
intraparietal cortices which are involved in the 
fast localisation of limbs in space (Graziano, 
1999; Graziano et al., 2000), but not involved 
in visual object recognition and the ﬁ  ne analysis 
of visual scenes. This realisation is important for 
Figure 2 | Looking down at your virtual body. A seated participant wears a head-mounted display, and looks down 
to see a virtual body in place of his real one.Frontiers in Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  September  2009 | Volume  3 | Issue  2 | 220
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representations. If so, this would demonstrate 
that multisensory recalibration could occur as 
a result of internal simulation of action and its 
sensory consequences. This issue is not fully 
settled yet, given that in Perez-Marcos et al. the 
illusion of ownership did not go along with prop-
rioceptive drift. Future experiments whereby the 
participants can execute different types of virtual 
hand movements via so called ‘un-cued’ BCI may 
be a promising avenue for future experiments 
of this sort.
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FUTURE PERSPECTIVE
BCI control of owned virtual bodies will prob-
ably have many important clinical and industrial 
applications, for example in the development of 
the next-generation BCI applications for totally 
paralysed individuals. These people would in 
principle be able to control and own a virtual 
body and engage in interactions in simulated 
environments. The ﬁ  rst attempt in this direc-
tion (Experiment 3; Perez-Marcos et al., 2009) 
suggests that this dream might have a chance of 
success. When the motor imagery resulted in the 
expected opening and closing of the virtual hand 
then the ownership illusion and motor recruit-
ment occurred (but not proprioceptive drift). 
The fundamental question here is whether a 
correlation between intentions of movement 
and pure visual feedback, in the absence of any 
tactile or proprioceptive feedback, is sufﬁ  cient 
to induce the rubber hand illusion and produce 
recalibration of visual, tactile and proprioceptive 
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